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Chapter 2  
Explaining Constitutional Change:  
Comparing the Logic, Advantages  
and Shortcomings of Static and  
Dynamic Approaches 
 
Astrid Lorenz 
 
There is a large and diverse body of empirical research on constitutional change and ‘new 
constitutionalism’ in contemporary societies, yet a general theory of constitutional change is still lacking. 
Researchers interested in democratic constitutionalism are confronted with various competing assumptions 
and explanations regarding particular, often unrelated, cases. In order to facilitate cross-referencing and 
conceptual consistency in the study of new constitutionalism in Latin America, this chapter provides an 
overview of the main theoretical perspectives on constitutional change beyond the specific regional context 
of Latin America, classifies the existing studies on constitutional change, and discusses their individual 
advantages and shortcomings. 
The chapter distinguishes between static and dynamic approaches according to their logic of 
explanation (not according to issues of explanation), thus contributing to the current conceptual discussion 
in comparative research on institutional change, and constitutions in particular. Static or constant-cause 
approaches explain constitutional change using particular variables, or sets of variables, the causal effect of 
which on constitutional continuity or change is always the same. X affects Y, therefore variations of X 
result in variations of Y. Dynamic approaches explain constitutional change as an effect of variables, or sets 
of variables, which may vary over the course of time. According to them, variations of X do not necessarily 
result in variations of Y, depending on the broader context. 
The chapter first describes the current status of research on constitutional change, its systems of 
classification, and outlines a framework to evaluate the explanatory power of different approaches to 
researching the topic. The second part provides a review and evaluation of static approaches. The third part 
investigates dynamic approaches; and the fourth part, based on a comparison of the main features of the 
approaches, specifies how each of them contributes to theory-building about constitutional developments in 
Latin America and other regions of the world. 
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Classifying and Evaluating Studies on Constitutional Change 
 
The term ‘new constitutionalism’ captures the fact that constitutions have spread all over the world, 
enhanced judiciable civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and changed the relationship 
between central states and regions, and between the state and its citizens. This trend has also increased the 
importance of constitutional courts, ombudsmen and other institutions which supervise compliance with 
norms in practice (Roesler 2007). 
Accordingly, the research on constitutions has grown. Bibliographies and reviews of studies on 
constitutionalism show that many empirical studies have analysed constitutional change in various ways 
and with different goals in mind (Law 2010, Bufacchi 1995, CEPC 2003). Some of these studies focus on 
the effects of particular institutions established by constitutions (Sartori 1994, Lane and Mæland 2000, 
Congleton and Swedenborg 2006), while others describe their symbolic character and integrative function 
(Vorländer 2002). Some analyses investigate how constitutional decisions are taken in the age of 
globalization and transnational, international and supranational law (Wiener 2008, Weiler and Wind 2003, 
Slaughter and Burke-White 2002), while others are more focused on how constitutions are created and 
changed after revolutions or more general processes of political transformation (Elster, Offe and Preuss 
1998). Comparative studies on constitutional change include comparative case studies (Weaver 2000, 
Manfredi 1997, Kaiser 2002, Lorenz 2011), and analyses based on a large number of cases (Lutz 1994, 
Negretto 2009, Roberts 2008, Lorenz 2005, Ferejohn 1997, Law and Versteeg 2011). 
Despite these tremendous efforts to research constitutional change empirically, there is still neither a 
satisfactory general theory on constitutional change nor a consistent terminology or typology of 
constitutional change in political science or law (Grimm 1994: 316, Voßkuhle 2004: 458). Most of these 
analyses are case studies, which attempt to explain a particular constitutional reform or its effects within a 
given context. Studies of this type often focus much more on the empirical details of the case than on 
overarching theoretical questions, failing to link systematically their findings to other case studies. Such 
studies use various sets of explanatory variables that are operationalized in different ways, while ignoring 
variables which are considered to be of great importance in other theoretical or empirical analyses of 
constitutional change. As a result, many case studies produce a wealth of empirical data but are inefficient 
when it comes to exploiting this wealth to enrich theory-building on constitutional change or comparative 
empirical research. 
Large-N comparative studies of constitutional amendments and replacements are significantly fewer 
in number because they must rely on difficult to obtain homogeneous and valid data for a large number of 
cases. These studies often test hypotheses which, though theoretically convincing, fail to explain 
constitutional change empirically and are more or less inconsistent with the observations made by experts 
on particular cases and countries. The absence of data on real events or  
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on the games that real actors play leads to an inefficient exploitation of advanced methodological 
techniques, and to the creation of elegant but unrealistic theories (Green and Shapiro 1994). Therefore, 
researchers who work with particular cases often hesitate to pursue this line of research. 
In order to advance theory-building in the field of constitutional politics, it is necessary to promote 
and facilitate communication and coordination among researchers regarding their theoretical assumptions 
and foci of empirical research. This chapter therefore evaluates the logical structure of existing studies on 
constitutional change. It classifies static and dynamic approaches, and notes the advantages and 
shortcomings of each one. This classification departs from previous comparative analyses of studies on 
institutional change, of which studies on constitutions are a sub-species. Studies on institutional change are 
mainly divided into rational choice, historical and sociological approaches (Hall and Taylor 1996, 
Immergut 1998). This classification was based on the different understandings of what institutions are and 
the sources of change in each approach. As a result of fruitful academic debate, these approaches were 
reflected upon more consciously, so that points of tangency between them have grown and much cross-
borrowing of ideas and methods has taken place (Thelen 1999: 371, Scharpf 1997: 29ff.). All studies on 
institutions, for example, rely on rational actors. Therefore the classification has become somewhat vague. 
Today, the differences between static and dynamic models to explain institutional change1 are more 
striking because these approaches often use the same variables (culture, ideology or rational choice, among 
others) in different ways and contexts, which results in contradictory predictions and explanations. Some 
rational choice theorists, for example, derive their assumptions on institutional change from models of ‘one-
shot games’ with a small set of descriptive variables which are meant to explain the outcome. This is a kind 
of static modelling. Dynamic models consider the broader context and acknowledge the influence of time, 
or of recurring interactions, on the effect of these variables. This difference is explained in more detail in 
the following sections. 
The classification of static and dynamic approaches brings together studies on constitutional change 
with discussions in other policy fields that have focused increasingly on processes, time and sequences 
(Cohen et al. 1972, Kingdon 1995, Pierson 2000, Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997, Thelen 2003). This 
chapter also uses universal criteria to evaluate the structure of the approaches used to explain constitutional 
change (De Vaus 2001), specifying which concept of constitutional change they adopt, their logic, the 
elements and level of complexity (number of variables and links) of explanation, the scope of cases which 
the approach attempts to explain, the level of abstraction, and the testability of the approaches for more  
1 Thelen proposes a quite similar classification of ‘constant-cause explanations’ and ‘path-dependency explanations’ 
(Thelen 2003: 214ff.): However, since dynamic models of explanation do not always focus on path dependency (see 
below), this chapter uses the term ‘dynamic approaches’. 
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than one case. These criteria relate to the general structure of the approaches. Methodological questions are 
left out because any theory and research design may be combined with any method of data collection, with 
qualitative or quantitative research methods (De Vaus 2001), which are therefore not specific to particular 
approaches. The results of the systematic evaluation of the approaches can be used to identify the 
advantages and shortcomings of each, as well as to provide recommendations regarding their suitability for 
specific research questions and the appropriateness of the combined application of these approaches. 
 
 
Static Approaches: Clear, Universal, Limited Variables 
 
Static approaches operationalize constitutional change as the formal adoption of a constitution or 
constitutional amendment. This political decision is explained using variables or sets of variables which 
consistently cause the same effects. These approaches, although generally open to testing many variables, 
often focus on one or a small number of relatively abstract possible causes, such as culture, constitutional 
rigidity or federalism. The explanatory models developed are quite clear and simple. This allows for 
comparisons of many cases and increases the probability that the models may be universally valid, that is, 
able to explain many, if not all, cases. 
On closer examination, static approaches often focus on either the genuine structural causes of 
change or on the processing of these causes by political actors, which is restricted by existing institutional 
norms. The first group of studies starts from the premise that constitutions are based on, and reflect, 
particular ideas. They are seen, for example, as institutional solutions to ensure political efficiency, as 
resulting from power relations, or as reflecting cultural norms. Accordingly, shifts in the underlying 
conditions must result in changes to the constitution, which would otherwise risk being abandoned and 
substituted by another (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009, Negretto in this volume). These explanatory 
models are based on the implicit or explicit assumption that constitutions are in equilibrium with the 
‘founding’ variables. Changing the constitution is a way to preserve or to re-establish equilibrium with the 
underlying variables (Thelen 2003: 212). 
At the same time, many scholars (and politicians) believe that democracy can be ‘designed at the 
drawing board’ by wise political actors (Sartori 1994) or exported from established democracies to 
authoritarian states. Democratization studies conceptualize constitutional change as an important 
prerequisite for reforming political systems as a whole. Democratization must include the introduction of 
democratic constitutionalism in order to guarantee fundamental rights, free elections, the separation of 
powers, and the rule of law (Elkins 2010: 973). Constitutional changes in Latin America are therefore often 
assessed positively.  
Another variable that is assumed to be important when explaining constitutional politics and change 
is the federal or unitary character of a country. Federal constitutions are introduced in heterogeneous 
countries in order to satisfy  
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the interests of various social groups. They institutionalize a higher degree of institutional complexity. Even 
incremental context changes at the federal or state level often result in complex shifts and changes in other 
policy domains or at another level. The representatives of the various territorial authorities, and elected 
politicians at the federal level, all have significant influence and have formal means to defend their interests 
(Behnke and Benz 2009, Riker 1964, Bednar 2005, Livingston 1956). Federal systems are thus constantly 
facing incentives or pressure to change the constitutional order, so constitutional amendments are more 
likely to occur. Non-federal systems are less complex, and potentially diverging national or regional 
interests are not institutionalized. Accordingly, established unitary democracies face considerably fewer 
incentives and less pressure to change their constitution. This example demonstrates that static approaches 
to explain constitutional change may well recognize certain dynamics in theorizing about the interrelations 
between the variables, but their overall effect is formally modelled as constant. 
Constitutional culture or tradition is also often considered to have a significant and quite constant 
influence on constitutional change. It has been noted that different constitutions have resulted from the 
differences between the concepts underlying US constitutionalism, Anglo-Saxon rule of law, the German 
Rechtsstaat and the French état de droit over ‘how much’ rule of law a democracy needs and over the 
nature of sovereignty (Rosenfeld 2001, Offe and Preuss 1991). Constitutions preserve these differences and 
have a strong impact on political decisions and on the national identity of the constitutional community 
(Ackerman 1989: 477, Law and Versteeg 2011). Constitutional change may serve to protect the community 
against new norms imposed by external forces or to preserve the compatibility between the polity and the 
constitutional culture when facing moderate shifts in the interpretation of the constitution and its principles 
(cf. Smith 2003, Vorländer 2002, Gebhardt 1999, Brodocz 2003). 
As stated previously, another group of studies which uses a static approach focuses more on the 
factors determining how actors process incentives and pressures to change the constitution. These studies 
do not necessarily follow the logic of equilibrium solutions, but rather suggest that institutional provisions 
for amending a constitution determine how the various incentives for change are translated into 
constitutional amendments or replacements. It is one of the fundamental provisions of all constitutions that 
all modifications and amendments must be approved by a political majority. Many researchers assume that 
high procedural obstacles to constitutional change cause lower constitutional amendment rates, 
irrespectively of the particular incentives to change the constitution emanating from its environment 
(among others, Acosta Romero 1993: 13, Lutz 1994, Ferejohn 1997: 523, Maddex 1996: 13, Manfredi 
1997: 132, Weaver 2000, Spiliotopoulos 1995; Venizelos 1999). Indeed, in a one-time interaction, the 
larger the number of actors involved in the decision-making process, the higher the cost of consensus-
building, the higher the value of the forgone benefit of not undertaking certain other activities in that time, 
and the higher the risk that single political actors will veto a proposal. 
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The quality and length of the constitution are two other, more or less static, characteristics believed to 
have an influence on the probability of constitutional change. High quality constitutions are hypothesized to 
change less frequently, while constitutions which have certain shortcomings are believed to be changed 
more often (Sartori 1994). Extensive constitutions are theorized to be changed more often because they 
contain more provisions which may not stand the test of time, or may no longer be compatible with the 
interests of actors; by contrast, less extensive constitutions are considered to be more flexible and open to 
implicit (informal) change by interpretation which makes formal change unnecessary (Lutz 1994, Elkins, 
Ginsburg and Melton 2009). Here, the quality of an established constitution and its length are factors which 
constantly influence the processing of incentives and pressure for change. 
The effect of the particular circumstances in which a constitutional amendment is proposed on the 
processing of the amendment proposal is another constant cause for constitutional change. Such variables 
include the partisan veto structure, the discrepancy or congruence between the veto players’ preferences, 
and the scope of reform of the amendment proposal. Rationalist and institutionalist studies explain 
constitutional change on the basis of the configuration of veto players who benefit from a specific 
institutional configuration (Elster 1993, Holmes 1993: 196 ff, Sejersted 1993: 135, Bogdanor 1988: 4, Lane 
and Mæland 2000, Congleton 2006, Congleton and Swedenborg 2006, Laffin 2000). These studies suggest 
that actors generally adopt only such constitutional changes that promise a benefit for them, and that they 
prefer incremental modifications over extensive reform because the effects of the former are easier to 
predict (Voigt 1999, Sejersted 1993: 135, North 1990). 
The age of a constitution is another variable that is quite often used to explain constitutional 
amendments or replacements. It has been assumed that the older a constitution is, the more likely it is that it 
will be changed as a result of context changes (Roberts 2008, among many others). However, the 
mechanism behind the assumed correlation is not clear. What exactly causes constitutional change? The age 
of the constitution may be a dummy for various factors of change, including a change of ideas, integration 
into supranational organizations, and shifts in the distribution of power, among others. 
Because the set of variables is limited and the number of cases (observations) is high, there is the risk 
of misinterpretation. It is often argued, for example, that constitutional changes are an effect of 
democratization (Roberts 2008, for example). Indeed, this seems plausible at the first glance. However, the 
variable democratization is often operationalized and measured by using the rankings of Freedom House, 
the European Union (EU) or some other institution. These base their evaluation on the presence of formal 
institutional reform towards greater freedom or free elections, which become manifest in constitutional 
changes, inter alia. This means that the explanatory variable – democratization – already contains the aspect 
of institutional change, such that the explanation of institutional change becomes circular. Both the 
independent and the dependent variable measure the same thing. 
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Further, some Latin American cases indicate that the importance of constitutional change for 
democratization may be overestimated. Bolivia and Argentina maintained a constitution in 1982 and 1983 
that was enacted (Bolivia 1967) or modified (Argentina 1972) during an authoritarian period; in Chile the 
1980 constitution of the Pinochet dictatorship was simply amended in 1989. According to Elkins, Ginsburg 
and Melton (2009), roughly 19 and 27 per cent of transitions to democracy and authoritarianism, 
respectively, coincide with constitutional change, and authoritarian states often introduce constitutions with 
democratic elements for ‘window dressing’ purposes (see also Elkins 2010: 973f.). 
All in all, static approaches are very useful when explaining patterns of constitutional change across 
different political systems and constitutional principles. Other great advantages are that they are testable for 
many cases and helpful in determining the hierarchy of importance of different possible causal factors. 
Some empirical analyses have found strong evidence for their hypotheses. For example, it was shown that 
in established democracies the higher the degree of political fragmentation, the higher the constitutional 
amendment rate. Within these democracies, low constitutional rigidity is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for constitutional amendments (Lorenz 2010). 
However, this approach has its limitations. Constant-cause models do not adequately explain why the 
willingness to cooperate in constitutional politics often changes over time without any modification of the 
variables responsible for the genesis of the constitution. Nor can they explain the emergence of varying 
constitutional preferences within a system or a situation. If, say, a particular constitutional culture has 
significant effects on constitutional development, then why do actors who are influenced by this culture 
develop diverging constitutional preferences? Further, such approaches do not sufficiently explain why 
some institutions remain stable despite context changes, while others implicitly change (cf. Thelen 2003: 
210). 
The empirical evidence for the explanatory power of some of the above variables for constitutional 
change varies considerably. In general, constitutional amendments and replacements take place much more 
frequently than conventional constant-cause models suggest. Irrespective of this general trend, cycles of 
constitutional activism can be observed in many systems, which may not be explained by shifts in the 
abovementioned explanatory variables. The federal or unitary character of a system, for example, often 
remains stable while the system experiences phases of constitutional continuity and change. Some recent 
empirical studies suggest that the effect of institutional obstacles to constitutional amendments, such as 
required majorities and referenda, has, in fact, been overestimated (Rasch and Congleton 2006, Roberts 
2008). 
In some cases, the explanation offered is insufficient to account for the entire sample under study. 
The pattern of constitutional change in federal democracies, for instance, is divided. Most such democracies 
change their constitutions frequently, while others rarely adopt regular laws to promote explicit 
constitutional change (the US, Australia and Canada). The evaluation of the investigated sample also  
38 
 
shows that the relationship between rigidity and constitutional change is much more evident in Latin 
America (Negretto 2009) than in the longer established democracies (Lorenz 2010). Obviously, with partial 
explanations such as these, we face the well-known methodological problems of having a small number of 
cases with their own characteristics, and of the uneven distribution of cases. 
Because of the lack of adequate operationalizations and comparable data such as the effect of culture, 
some hypotheses have not been tested systematically for many cases, although important steps have taken 
in this direction (for example, by Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009). Given this, the great advantage of 
static approaches – the possibility of testing hypotheses for many cases and of developing universal 
explanations – cannot be fully exploited in practice. It is not yet clear whether this is due to the current 
status of empirical research or because the logic of their theoretical foundations is not adequate to explain 
real-world developments. 
 
 
Dynamic Approaches: Multi-Causal, Complex, Detailed 
 
Like static approaches, dynamic studies conceive of constitutional change as the adoption of a constitution 
or constitutional amendment. In order to explain it, they take into account different variables at detailed 
stages of development, such as informal agreements during negotiations, and a change of norms without 
modifications to the text. This is because they assume that variables do not necessarily have the same effect 
on constitutional continuity or change at every point in time, and that formal stages of development (such as 
the adoption of a constitutional amendment) are not the end of the story. Regarding Latin America, for 
example, it has been noted that introducing or reforming democratic constitutions does not guarantee 
political change if other context variables are not sufficiently benevolent. Often, constitutional changes 
even are not intended to ensure the long-term effect of norms but to mobilize short-term public support in a 
given political situation (cf. Cifuentes 2007; Garzón Valdés 2000). 
Obviously, factors that were responsible for the genesis of an institution may be different from those 
sustaining it over time, which neutralize that institution’s effects in practice and generate pressure or 
incentives to change it (cf. Thelen 2003: 218). Because of the complex nature of interaction effects, timing 
and sequencing are important. Detailed process-tracing analyses are therefore useful to identify how 
configurations of variables affect constitutional development. 
While dynamic approaches generally focus on variables similar to those used by static approaches, 
because they adopt a broader subject of investigation and diverging logic of explanation, they are can use 
many different variables as potential determinants of constitutional change. Typical elements include the 
relations and interaction between particular actors within a given institutional context. Actors must be 
aware of the reasons for change, develop institutional alternatives, and negotiate these alternatives before 
change can take place (Braun  
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2009, Weaver 2000, Kaiser 2002, Schultze 2000, Bogdanor 1988, Elster and Slagstad 1993, Banting and 
Simeon 1985). Other explanatory variables include (sequences of) previous political choices and 
contingencies, longer historical processes, and varying political and social contexts. The variables are not 
seen as being independent from each other and are operationalized in various ways, from a relatively low2 
to a high level of abstraction. Their varying configurations are understood as descriptions of specific 
episodes, or as turning points within longer processes. The inclusion of the different possible variants of 
various factors covering longer periods of time results in detailed and complex models. 
The important added advantage of process-tracing studies is that they examine the dynamics of actors 
or social structures and their interaction with formal constitutional rules, such as political struggle, 
compromise, and the diffusion of ideas. Process-tracing studies can explain shifts in actors’ willingness to 
change the constitution in an unchanged context, the varying amplitude or frequency of constitutional 
change within a system, and the timing of reform. But before discussing the advantages and shortcomings 
of static and dynamic approaches, let us illustrate this point by considering a few examples of different 
types of process-tracing studies. 
Historical sociological approaches base their explanations on the analysis of extended periods of 
time, pointing out the impact of political struggles and crises (Banting and Simeon 1985, Levinson 1995b, 
Loewenstein 1961), and acknowledging the possibility that factors which were not important during the 
making of a constitution may become important for constitutional change. Changes in a constitution may 
become necessary if provisions that were considered appropriate at the time the constitution was adopted 
have become inadequate because the social, economic and political context has changed (Loewenstein 
1961: 21, Bogdanor 1988: 381). Here, changes in the broader context stimulate particular changes in actors’ 
preferences and lead to institutional change. Crises, domestic change, and changes in the international 
context such as supranationalization and other phenomena, interact and may together open windows of 
opportunity for constitutional change. Studies on European constitutionalism, for example, have shown 
how actors are influenced by past national norms but may develop new perceptions and supranational 
norms (Wagner 1999). Thus, variables are not seen as universally causing certain effects. 
Some studies point out that constitutions are shaped by struggles between classes and other 
macrostructures, but that constitutional change is mainly the result of the interplay between political elites 
competing for resources. In Germany, after the adoption of the constitution in 1949, distinct modes of 
interaction emerged among parties and Länder governments, which allowed a trade-off between party  
2 The level of abstraction is considered to be low if, for example, a study distinguishes between nominal parties rather 
than classifying them according to whether they belong to the government or the opposition, or according to their 
ideological position, party family, electoral success, blackmailing power, or other criteria. 
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competition, on the one hand, and joint policy-making, on the other. These actors frequently adopted 
constitutional amendments concerning the redistribution of responsibilities and finances between the 
federal level and the Länder. The direction of change was always influenced by the particular power 
relations in place among the actors involved. In the 1990s, for example, diverging partisan majorities in the 
chambers of parliament made it more difficult for the Christian Democrats, then the ruling government 
party at the federal level, to achieve their policy goals. Christian Democratic leaders of Länder governments 
then initiated a public debate on what they called ‘good federalism’, which would make federalism more 
competitive and give the federal and sub-national levels more decision-making autonomy. This resulted in a 
slight shift in the public perception of federalism, and when the Social Democrats, in their role as the ruling 
government party, later faced decision-making problems caused by diverging majorities similar to those 
experienced by the Christian Democrats earlier, they, too, changed their minds. This opened the way for 
negotiations of a reform of federalism in Germany which – after complicated interactions which cannot be 
discussed here in detail – eventually led to more competitive federalism (Scharpf 2009). 
Dynamic models, however, may also focus on a smaller set of variables, such as the interaction 
between decision-making costs and the rigidity of amendment procedures. It has been argued that, given a 
constant constitutional rigidity, each constitutional amendment adopted within a specific period of time 
lowers the de facto threshold for subsequent amendments because it decreases the associated decision-
making cost. The reason for this effect is that an infrastructure of negotiation emerges, which can be used 
for other negotiations later. Actors also tend to have more trust in each other’s willingness to cooperate 
because the stable overall institutional framework allows them to anticipate future interactions without 
fearing instability as a possible negative externality of constitutional change. All else being equal, the more 
stable the overall institutional framework and the shorter the period of time since the last constitutional 
amendment, the higher the probability that a constitutional amendment under negotiation will be adopted. 
Over time, this scale effect diminishes the impact of institutional restrictions to change, favouring a slight 
overall increase in the number of constitutional amendments – but only to a certain point – while 
constitutional rigidity remains the same (Lorenz and Seemann 2009). This model of explanation is dynamic 
because the individual variables do not cause constant or linear effects, it is their interaction which disturbs 
such causal relationship and results in non-constant and non-linear effects. 
Other empirical analyses of constitutional politics emphasize the role of negotiation dynamics in 
explaining constitutional change (Braun 2009, Schultze 2000, Schönlau 2003, Elster 1993, Elster et al. 
1998), including sequences of varying interaction orientations (cf. Scharpf 2003: 10ff). During the first 
negotiation phase, proposals for even minor alterations of the constitution cause major conflicts and actors 
are only willing to cooperate on issues which further their own interests. If the agenda-setter is still able to 
step into negotiations at this point, the  
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players are more inclined to compromise and to argue (instead of bargaining) in the second phase. Often, 
constitutional provisions are agreed upon, even if they require considerable changes to the powers and 
routines of the participants and thus are very costly (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Scharpf 1988, 2003, and 
Closa 2004). This leads to an asymmetry of possible benefits which puts the agenda-setter at an advantage. 
During the competitive last stage of negotiations, actors agree to cooperate if they expect gains from the 
amendment or from side benefits; if the adoption is compatible with tactics in political competition; and if 
the agenda-setter is willing to make necessary modifications or to accept demands symbolically. So the 
conditions for compromise vary over time despite a stable overall context. 
Inter-venue effects during negotiations and the emergence of a path of negotiation also have an 
influence on constitutional change, in that they reduce the number of perceived options for constitutional 
change. For example, small gains are more readily accepted during the final stage of negotiations than 
during the first negotiation phase because the actors evaluate these gains in relative rather than in absolute 
terms, comparing the gains with those of others who negotiated previously with the agenda-setter. Risk 
aversion is also lower in this phase than in the first stage. Both phenomena are obviously influenced by the 
fact that the actors want what is often a protracted negotiation process to result in a decision rather than a 
non-decision. When a constitutional amendment is finally adopted, the distribution of gains that follows is 
shaped substantially by the first proposal of the agenda-setter and by a number of agreements made during 
the competitive stage of negotiations; while compromises reached during the cooperative stage of 
negotiations usually focus on operational and legal issues of implementation, not on alternative ways to 
reach the political aims or on the suitability of these political aims as such (Lorenz 2011, Weaver 2000). 
Dynamic approaches are well-suited to explain how decisions on constitutional change and the 
details of these decisions are influenced by fluid configurations of variables; and how and why interaction 
effects between variables may eliminate the effect of single structural determinants such as culture, 
federalism and constitutional rules. Dynamic approaches make it easier to explain why constitutional 
development does not always follow the predicted course or why, contrary to what constant-cause 
approaches suggest, constitutions are immune to certain incentives or pressures to change. 
However, the main advantage of dynamic approaches – their complexity – is also a major obstacle 
when trying to formulate a consistent general theory of constitutional change. In general, the more 
variables, levels of analysis, and interplays between variables over the course of time are included in the 
explanatory model, the more difficult it becomes to really understand all the interactions among the 
variables, to avoid the problem of collinearity (some independent variables are approximate or linear 
combinations of some other variables), and to ensure that the general model makes sense. Even if the 
independent variables are logically independent from each other, often more than two variables co-vary, 
which makes it impossible to determine and confirm the hierarchy of the causal factors. And  
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even where specific combinations of causes for constitutional change can be isolated for specific cases, 
such combinations may be so particular that they cannot be tested for many cases and so the assumptions 
regarding causal relationships cannot be considered universally valid. 
Sometimes even complex analyses culminate in ‘thin’ diagnoses of the main cause of constitutional 
change. This is especially true for the many case studies which identify certain actors as having caused a 
constitutional amendment or constitutional replacement. Charles de Gaulle, for example, was considered to 
have ‘caused’ the introduction of the French Fifth Republic in 1958, which gave him and the government 
more power (Carcassone 1988). At first glance, this is a historical fact, but it is not a causal explanation 
which can be applied to other cases or be falsified. Even if we focus the explanation on de Gaulle’s 
intention to maximize power, this is not a valid explanation because many actors strive to maximize their 
power and do not succeed in introducing (indeed, may not even want to introduce) a constitution 
comparable to that of the Fifth Republic. So explanations which rely on certain persons are precise only at 
first glance. 
As with static approaches, the assumed effect of other key variables is often plausible but too 
unspecific to be empirically testable (cf. Grimm 1994: 316). Political instability and crisis, which are often 
believed to cause constitutional change, are vague concepts. What we mean by political instability or crisis 
depends on subjective evaluations, unless we can define them in precise terms. Therefore, their possible 
effect on constitutional change can only be measured for more than one case if they are clearly defined and 
operationalized. But how to determine the type or level of political instability or crisis that inevitably leads 
either to constitutional change or has no impact whatsoever on a constitution? 
It is interesting to note that, unlike static approaches, process-tracing studies generally do not intend 
to provide comprehensive, universal explanations. A greater willingness to contribute to theory-building 
would no doubt lead to more joint efforts to resolve the abovementioned problems. 
 
 
Recommendations for Use in Comparative Perspective 
 
Which of the two approaches described in this chapter is best suited to explain constitutional change? 
Before we summarize their respective advantages and shortcomings, it is important to emphasize that the 
dynamic or static character of the approaches does not, in itself, imply any specific prediction as to the 
frequency of constitutional amendment or replacement. Static models may well predict many reforms if the 
key variables are assumed to stimulate change, while dynamic approaches may predict constitutional 
continuity if the key variables are assumed to cause path dependency and stalemate. Some authors have 
argued, for example, that even unfavourable institutional configurations may produce increasing returns and 
therefore remain stable (cf. Pierson 2000, Thelen 1999: 384 ff.). As already mentioned, both approaches 
also base their explanations on similar variables. 
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Table 2.1 Explanatory features of static and process tracing approaches 
 Static approaches  Dynamic approaches  
Subject Formal adoption of a constitution or constitutional amendment 
Various types of change, including 
implicit change of the constitution 
Logic 
First assumption: Constitutions are the 
result of specific variables. If the 
variables change, then the constitution 
also changes.  
Second assumption: All constitutional 
change must pass through an 
institutional, actor-related bottleneck. 
Third assumption: Variables that lead to 
the genesis of a constitution may be 
different from those which determine its 
subsequent development.  
Fourth assumption: The variables must 
not necessarily have the same effect at 
every point in time. 
Elements 
Federal/unitary system, culture, 
constitutional rules and power 
relations, among others. 
See under static approaches, plus 
contingencies, interactions and 
embeddedness. 
Level of 
abstraction Medium-to-high Low-to-high 
Complexity Low-to-medium Low-to-high 
Universality Medium-to-high Valid for particular cases or mid-range 
Testability Good Limited 
Useful for 
explaining 
Long-term patterns of change across 
different political systems and 
different constitutional norms; 
hierarchy of causal factors 
Change that contradicts the previous 
influence of variables; varying 
willingness to implement change and 
frequency of change in unchanged 
contexts; the timing of reform 
Not useful for 
explaining 
Temporal variation within political 
systems; the timing of change; implicit 
change; change without changes in the 
‘founding variables’ 
Hierarchy of the causal factors; many 
cases (if the model is moderately or 
highly complex) 
 
 
The difference between the two approaches used to explain constitutional change consists in their 
logic of explanation rather than in the expectation of change or continuity and the explanatory variables. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the observations detailed in this chapter regarding the main explanatory features. The 
first assumption, adopted by static approaches, is that constitutions are results of particular variables. If 
these variables change, then the constitution also changes. The second assumption describes this 
relationship more precisely by adding  
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that all constitutional change must pass through an institutional, actor-related bottleneck. Both these 
assumptions are widely accepted in political research on democratic constitutionalism. The third basic 
assumption used in dynamic approaches is in conflict with the first assumption in that it asserts that 
variables which lead to the genesis of a constitution may be different from those which determine its 
subsequent development. However, the possibility expressed in this may be implies that the first assumption 
might also be true. The same holds for the fourth assumption, which states that all variables do not 
necessarily have the same effect at every point in time. The latter assumption may not contradict the first 
and third assumptions, but it significantly reduces their ability to explain constitutional change, thus 
broadening the focus of explanation to include a larger array of possible explanatory variables in various 
possible explanatory configurations. 
The first and second assumptions may also result in complex explanatory models (although actually 
they are often less complex), but dynamic approaches allow for more elements to be taken into account, 
including contingencies, interaction effects of variables, and varying configurations of variables over time. 
The level of abstraction of both approaches is medium to high, but in practice there are many applications 
of a dynamic approach with a low level of abstraction. While hypotheses derived from static approaches 
generally can be tested easily because of the lower level of complexity involved, the findings from dynamic 
studies can only be tested to a certain degree. However, unlike static approaches, dynamic studies usually 
do not intend to provide universal explanatory models anyway. 
This comparison of the explanatory features of static and process tracing approaches suggests that 
each provides valuable insights into the relationships between actors, institutions and the broader context, 
and their effects on constitutional change and continuity. Static approaches are particularly well-suited to 
identify long-term patterns of constitutional amendment and replacement across different political systems 
and different constitutional norms; and are better able to determine the hierarchy of causal factors. 
Ironically, however, political science has thus far failed to exploit this key advantage and establish a general 
explanation for constitutional change that can be verified empirically for a high number of cases. 
However, this theoretical gap can be filled by using more detailed approaches that include time-
related variables, which makes them well-suited to explain how decisions about constitutional change, and 
the details of these decisions, are influenced by dynamics of interaction between the variables; and how and 
why these interactions and contingencies influence the effect of culture, constitutional rules or federalism, 
as hypothesized by static approaches. Dynamic approaches can explain a varying willingness to implement 
change and the frequency of change in unchanged contexts as well as the timing of reforms. However, the 
additional insights provided by these approaches, while satisfying the demand for greater in-depth 
knowledge and complex explanations, may not be testable for other cases if they are very specific; and they 
may fail to identify the hierarchy of influence of the selected variables. 
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The above comparison allows us to make some recommendations regarding the use of these 
approaches. Studies on constitutional stability and change should be designed with due consideration for 
the above described advantages and shortcomings, and for the results of other studies. Ideally, such studies 
should always prove whether the approaches really arrive at diverging explanations of a given empirical 
phenomenon. If the explanations or predictions differ only slightly or establish different foci, it is 
reasonable to use a static approach because it is less demanding with regard to data collecting and 
processing and has strong methodological advantages. However, if they are in conflict, then it should be 
investigated in depth and for more cases which one of the alternative explanations is more suitable. 
Notwithstanding this general recommendation, each approach is particularly useful for certain 
research questions. Dynamic approaches are the most appropriate when explaining the varying willingness 
to implement change, and the frequency of change within systems and unchanged contexts; and the 
underlying political mechanisms of constitutional change and continuity. Static approaches do not work in 
such cases. They are more appropriate when the main research interest is to identify general patterns of 
constitutional change across political systems with different constitutional norms, and to determine a causal 
hierarchy of determinants. Provided they are employed in such a way as to complement and challenge each 
other, both approaches combined have the potential to contribute to theory-building. 
 
 
Concluding Summary 
 
Inspired by the apparent absence of a general theory of constitutional change, this chapter has compared the 
structure, advantages and shortcomings of existing studies beyond Latin America, and assessed their 
contribution to theory-building. To this end, existing studies were classified as static or dynamic in 
approach, because assuming a constant or dynamic effect of certain independent variables may result in 
competing predictions and is therefore the most obvious distinctive feature of the existing studies on 
constitutional change. 
It was shown that static approaches often base their explanatory models on a limited set of variables, 
formulate clear hypotheses, and attempt to develop universally valid explanations; by contrast, dynamic 
approaches propose multi-causal, detailed, complex models to explain constitutional change. While both 
approaches use structural and institutional variables to explain formal constitutional change or stability, 
dynamic approaches tend to operationalize constitutional change on a broader scale by highlighting 
interrelations between actors, contingencies and interactions of variables. They tend to use a lower level of 
abstraction and, in contrast to static approaches, are intended to develop mid-range theories rather than 
universal ones. The testability of static models of explanation is better. 
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What does this mean for those interested in studying new constitutionalism in Latin America? Based 
on the comparison, it is recommended that one should always consider whether static or dynamic 
approaches would result in competing explanations for a given empirical phenomenon, or in competing 
predictions concerning the results of given sets of variables. If they do compete, the appropriateness of the 
alternative explanations should be investigated in depth. In general, the use of a static approach has 
methodological advantages when it comes to identifying general patterns of constitutional change across 
political systems, and different constitutional norms and a causal hierarchy of determinants. If, for example, 
strong constitutional improvements of minority rights and the introduction of direct democracy do not go 
hand in hand with changes in practice, then such approaches could demonstrate that an authoritarian 
environment hampers compliance with constitutional rights. But they cannot explain why rights provisions 
were improved if that authoritarian environment remained constant. The use of dynamic approaches is 
recommended where the aim of research is to explain this varying willingness to implement constitutional 
change, and the frequency of change in unchanged contexts. They are also suitable to explain the 
underlying political mechanisms of constitutional change and continuity. There is considerable potential for 
complementarity between both approaches to contribute to theory-building, so they may be combined. 
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